Do you drill in a cellar with machine guns?

I hurried up to Columbia University to inform my friends on the campus that I had located the Communist Party, had made contact with it, and was, in fact, a registered member. By chance, the first man I met as I crossed the campus was one of my literary friends. I told him the news. As usual, he squinted one eye and lifted the eyebrow of the other, so that he looked as if he were peering through a monocle. “Do you drill in a cellar with machine guns?” he asked airily.    --Whittaker Chambers

Posted via web from jimnichols's posterous

unemployment rate...

Is the U.S. Unemployment Rate Today Already as High as It Was in 1982?
March 2009, John Schmitt and Dean Baker

In 1982, the United States experienced the highest annual unemployment rate since the Great Depression – 9.7 percent. In principle, that rate is directly comparable to the 8.1 percent seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for February 2009, and suggests that current unemployment is still not as bad as it was in 1982.

The official unemployment rate, however, masks two important differences between the unemployment rate in 1982 and today. The first difference is demographic. In 1982, the US population was substantially younger than it is today. Even in an otherwise identical economy, we would expect a younger population to have a higher unemployment rate than an older population would. The second difference is statistical. The main government survey used to measure the unemployment rate – the Current Population Survey (CPS) reaches a smaller share of the population today than it did in 1982, and is especially likely to miss people who are not employed. As a result, the official unemployment rate understates the unemployment rate relative to 1982.

lessons from the New Deal

The Senate committee for Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing on "Lessons from the New Deal": Panel 1: The Hon. Christina D. Romer, Chair, President's Council of Economic Advisors. Panel 2: Dr. James K. Galbraith, University of Texas at Austin; Dr. J. Bradford DeLong, University of California at Berkeley; Dr. Allan M. Winkler, Miami (Ohio) University; Dr. Lee E. Ohanian, University of California at Los Angeles.

repeating Japan's mistakes....

Does Obama Have a Plan B?

In short, the U.S. government is looking to shovel capital into the banks without sufficient conditions, hiding rather than confronting the actual situation.

That is just like the Japanese government in their lost decade, or the U.S. officials during the 1980s before they really tackled the savings-and-loan crisis. In those cases, the delay simply made the problem worse over time and in the end the government had to put more money into the troubled banks directly, taking over or shutting down the weakest of them. Whatever the political culture, it would seem we have not learned from experience. Or perhaps we cannot act on our learning. The universal barrier would appear to be the political difficulty of recapitalizing banks. That seems obvious, but the constraint it puts on good policy is enormous.

That is why the Geithner plan is so complex and jury-rigged, to avoid the need for public requests for more money for banks. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to succeed absent additional public money and more-intrusive government action. The plan will buy some time and certainly some appreciation in bank share prices. Current shareholders will be getting a new lease on life with subsidies from taxpayers. For that reason alone, the plan certainly will cost the taxpayer more in the end than a more direct recapitalization with public control would have.

A year or two down the road, we will know for certain whether it worked. By then the banks will either return to normal pre-crisis lending or they will be both too distrusted and too distrustful even to borrow from each other again. As we have seen over the last 18 months, the latter is what near- insolvent banks do. When I was working with the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers and the Japanese business federation Keidanren in 2001-02 encouraging the Japanese government to do finally what was needed, it was the commitment of public money with tough conditions on the banks that we pushed for, and it was the normalization of the interbank market and then of lending behavior that showed success.

In essence, the U.S. Treasury’s plan to subsidize private investors’ purchases of the banks’ toxic assets is a too-clever-by-half mechanism to fix the banks while avoiding going to Congress for more upfront on-budget expenditures. One can imagine the discussions at the White House: We have a budget to pass, and cannot give up those goals to give the bankers still more. Figure out some way to do this off-budget. And so the Geithner plan hugely bribes private investors with taxpayer money, as Simon Johnson, Paul Krugman, Jeffrey Sachs, and I have all described, with one-way government insured bets. Yet the bets are contingent, they only pay when the taxpayer loses—and those losses first appear on the Fed or FDIC balance sheet, not subject to congressional approval.

I know that the very same self-limiting discussions took place at Okurasho, the Japanese Ministry of Finance circa 1995-1998. And they ended with the same result, a series of bank-recapitalization plans that tried to mobilize private-sector monies and overpay for distressed bank assets without forcing the banks to truly write off the losses. Even though the top Japanese technocrats at the ministry were even more insulated from a weak Diet than the congressionally unconfirmed advisers currently running economic policy for the Obama administration, they did worse. Whatever the political context, countries usually try to end banking crises on the cheap, with a limited public role at first, overpaying for distressed assets and failing to change banks’ behavior, only to have to go back in a couple of years later.

I hope the Geithner plan, combined with the other financial measures under way, proves to be an exception to the rule and succeeds in stabilizing the U.S. banking system. It could remove some of the bad assets from the banks’ balance sheets and put some capital into the banks. Even in that best case, though, it is clear that the avoidance of on-budget costs makes it penny-wise, pound-foolish, for the U.S. taxpayer. It will likely cost the taxpayer more on net, between the subsidies given and the transfer of most upside gains to the private investors, and the overpayments to current bank shareholders for toxic assets. If the U.S. government steps in more aggressively to take full ownership and pays a low price for these assets, the taxpayer would stand to get the full upside, even though it would require more cash up front. That would still be better than the Japanese experience.

But the pattern of these crises—Japan in the 1990s or the U.S. in the 1980s, and elsewhere around the world—leads me to believe that this partial fix will be temporary at best. The banks will still have the worst toxic assets on their books; their managers and shareholders’ incentives will not have changed. The banks will be playing with a fresh stack of public money with insufficient strings and probably insufficient capital. Then, 18 months or so down the road, the U.S. government will still have to put capital into the banks, because credit markets will break down again, with many banks again under water. But in that case, the necessary recapitalization would have to take place after this round of money is squandered and the current fiscal stimulus will have run out.

Part of the problem is that some of these distressed assets are genuinely toxic. They cannot be consistently valued and priced by anyone because they are part of larger securitized packages and so purchasers cannot disentangle the underlying investments behind them. Under the Treasury plan, those toxic assets are not restructured, but sold as-is just because of the federal guarantee offered against losses. Restructuring these assets would require government supermajority ownership, which so far seems to be politically unpalatable. In which case, the FDIC will end up paying out on the insurance for overpriced assets.

What the Obama team is proposing is disconcertingly similar to the actions of Japanese Prime Ministers Hashimoti, Obuchi, and Mori in 1995 and 1998: Rather than ask the legislature for straightforward recapitalization money, you have the political leadership preferring to risk overpaying current owners of toxic assets rather than forcing sales. For all of Japan’s supposed intervention in markets, its government still lacked the stomach for taking over banks, let alone closing them.

H.G. Wells, London, and the failure of summits By Dani Rodrik

What will a future H.G. Wells say of the London summit?

TPMtv: Lords of Finance

History of Stoicism Documentary

Economist Brad Delong on Karl Marx

Great Depression and workforce...

Understanding the Great Depression Blogging: Labor Input and Its Trend

The immediate answer to questions about Lee and Ohanian is that all the institutions they blame for high structural unemployment during the Great Depression were still there after World War II--yet no high structural unemployment then at all.

The hasty answer to Lee and Ohanian is that they are playing two jokers:

(1) They define "before Roosevelt" as the average of 1930-32 rather than as 1932.

(2) They assume that all of the declines in hours of work per week is due to deficient demand rather than to a much-desired increase in the bargaining power of workers who then choose to bargain for more leisure.

do you remember when the cops crashed the party in fairburn pines and we all had to go to court?

that was then... this is now...

Brad Delong

The difference between now and 1982 was that back in 1982 the interest rate on Treasury bills was 13.68%--there was a lot of room for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates and so reduce unemployment via monetary policy. Today the interest rate on Treasury bills is 0.03%--there is no room for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates, and so monetary policy is reduced to untried "quantitative easing" experiments.

The fact that monetary policy has shot its bolt and has no more room for action is what has driven a lot of people like me who think that monetary policy is a much better stabilization policy tool to endorse the Obama fiscal boost plan.

Safire on the speech

The Speech

Obama was wise not to blame only the capitalists for the sinking economy, as F.D.R. angrily had done; instead, he called it a “consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices.” That was an unexpectedly tolerant note, but which he stepped on with an imperious, lecturing pointer phrase about meeting challenges: “Know this, America.” That get-this tone is better directed to the Russians.

Adam Smith and slavery

Adam Smith's lost legacy

Public comment in Britain and North America, aided by endless television repetitions that ‘slavery’ means the ‘slave trade’ from Africa to the USA, is almost completely blind to the fact that slavery from Africa to the Arab Middle East, classical Europe, and all countries to the East, persisted for thousands of years (note the number of African slaves in ancient Egypt) long before America was ‘discovered’.

The appalling practice of slavery was widespread in Eastern Europe and Russia at the time Smith was writing Wealth Of Nations, and Smith was pessimistic that it would ever be abolished.

The camel-led slave-trading 'trains' that left sub-tropical Africa to cross the Sahara, hardly penetrate public consciousness in the way that the African slave ships, made visual by film and television, which only show of the lesser, and shorter in calendar time (though no less evil), slave trade to America.

Not only were Arab traders active in the overland slave trade, they were often the local slave agents active in supplying slaves to slave trading ships from Europe for the American and Caribbean markets.

When the American market was closed eventually by the self-imposed political action of the governments of the USA, Britain, and other European countries, the Arab slave traders continued their despicable trade north across the Sahara, and by sea along the East African coast.

the soviet decline...

Samuelson on Hayek, A Comment on Comments

while Hayek argued that centrally planned socialism would be inefficient, an argument PAS agrees with, Hayek no more forecast the moment of the Soviet collapse than did PAS or the CIA or pretty much anybody other than a French sociologist named Revel in 1976. Also, the severe economic decline in the Soviet bloc largely came after the political collapse of the bloc. It is not at all clear such a collapse would have happened without the political collapse, if the Soviet leaders in 1989 had cracked down on the independence demonstraters in Lithuania, the people fleeing across the Hungarian border into Austria, and of course supported the Honecker regime in East Germany in preventing the Berlin Wall from falling. After all, the upshot of the Chinese crushing the demonstrations in Tienanman Square was continued economic growth with a gradual transition to its current peculiar mixed economy that has grown very rapidly. And for all the carrying on many make about the Soviet economy, while it may have been inaccurate to describe it in 1989 as "thriving," and it was falling behind the US in growth, technical innovation, and quality of goods, it was functioning, and the population was not starving or homeless or without clothing or education or medical care, although it was politically repressed. But it had provided the industrial expansion that allowed it to build a military capacity that defeated Hitler's military at Stalingrad and Kursk. In short, this dumping all over PAS for these statements is fairly ridiculous, whatever one thinks of Samuelson's ultimate or broader influence on economics as the godfather of its mainstream neoclassical form in the last half of the 20th century.

the Bush years...

Farewell to All That: An Oral History of the Bush White House

ummmm.....

Confederate history month pushed by lawmakers

sigh...

let the good times... go?

Generation L and its fearful future

Long periods of peace and prosperity, however, are not always terribly interesting. Amid all the economic gloom, I do not think I am alone in feeling an odd excitement at the sense of living in uncertain and historic times. As Philip Larkin, a gloomy British poet, once wrote: “Life is first boredom/Then fear.” We have had the boredom. Now it is time for the fear.

Libertarianism

Modern Liberalism and Libertarianism: An Economist's View
By Brad DeLong

Let me give you what I take to be an American card-carrying modern liberal economist’s take on classical liberalism--which I think is broadly an updated version of Adam Smith's take. It is, in short, that modern liberal economists are wanderers who have been expelled from the garden of classical liberalism by the angel of history and reality with his flaming sword...

It starts with an observation that we are all somewhat more interdependent than classical liberalism allows. It is not completely true that it is from the self-interest and not the benevolence of the butcher that we expect our meat. Self-interest, yes, but benevolence too: a truly self-interested butcher would not trade you his meat for your money but instead slaughter you and sell you as long pig. So this opens up a gap between the libertarian view and the world.

That said, and modulus this basic human--well, call it "sympathy" as Adam Smith did--modern liberal economists were very happy for a long time with classical liberalism. Yes, there were externalities, and increasing returns over a range, and market power--but the presumption was that market failures were tolerable and in a sense optimal because of the magnitudes of government failures that would attend any attempt to compensate for them. The near-consensus of economists was at least crypto-classical liberalism, along the lines of Colbert's exchange with Legendre in the reign of Louis XIV:

"What do you need to help you?" asked Colbert. "Leave us alone" answered Legendre. ("Que faut-il faire pour vous aider?" asked Colbert. "Nous laisser faire" answered Legendre).

Then starting in the late nineteenth century liberal economists were mugged by reality:

--on issues of income distribution--the Gilded Age--and how laissez-faire did not appear to be producing the reasonable distribution of the fruits of the social division of labor that economists had all expected...

--on issues of macroeconomic stability--the Great Depression was a big shock--and the argument that the Great Depression arose because markets were not free enough never acquired legs or force outside the theological...

--on issues of the persistence of "unfree" labor--Adam Smith expected the imminent collapse of slavery, but ending slavery took a war, and the market economy in America did not appear to be doing very much at all to undermine Jim Crow...
last and most recently, the fear of the increasing importance of "market failure"--the coming of the "information economy"--caused economists to worry that we were moving from a Smithian to a Schumpeterian world, and even if the presumption of laissez faire works for a Smithian world it is not at all clear that it works for a Schumpeterian world...

The upshot is what Keynes said eighty-four years ago:

It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic activities. There is no ‘compact’ conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately. We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail what Burke termed “one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion”...

One way to understand Keynes's General Theory is that Say's Law is false in theory but that we can build the running code for limited, strategic interventions that will make Say's Law roughly true in practice. The modern Ametican liberal economist's view of libertarianism is much the same: libertarianism is false in theory, but it is very much worth figuring out a set of limited, strategic interventions that will make the libertarian promises roughly true in practice.

Niall Ferguson, the Ascent of Money

August 8th 1853

Marx: The Future Results of British Rule in India